When George W. Bush ordered the US invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, his purpose was simple: to incapacitate Al Qaeda. Although the operation was given the epithet “Enduring Freedom,” Bush made it clear that the invasion’s purpose was to secure freedom for the Western world. That is, freedom from the threat of the global jihad. The invading force was given minimal resources in keeping with Donald Rumsfeld’s and Paul Wolfowitz’s “light footprint” strategy, by which a small force of American soldiers was intended to kill and capture members of Al Qaeda while not stopping to rebuild the war torn nation. Powerful Afghan warlords were compensated for their assistance in ousting the Taliban and pursuing Al Qaeda, while valuable American resources were soon diverted from Afghanistan to Iraq. This minimalist approach was intended to end the conflict quickly with minimal expenditure of American lives and resources.

A change in strategy came about when policymakers realized the invasion would not be a brief excursion. In late 2001, international leaders and prominent Afghan nationals formulated the Bonn Agreement, which created a plan for establishing democracy in Afghanistan. Rhetoric shifted from pursuing Al Qaeda to rebuilding the Afghan nation and providing security and democracy for its people. In keeping with the logic that the “hearts and minds” of the Afghan people could be won through development of the country, governments of the West began the process of nation building with much haste and waste. The strategy of the US gradually morphed into an all-encompassing plan that aimed to rebuild a stable state, establish democratic rule of law, ensure regional stability, put a halt to the drug trade, secure human rights, and promote economic development. It was, to paraphrase scholar Rory Stewart, a list of exactly what Afghanistan lacked.

The building of a stable and functioning democracy has not yet occurred, as repeated onslaughts of Taliban insurgents have further destabilized the country and made development difficult, and corruption and incompetence in all levels of Afghan president Karzai’s government have cost it the legitimacy and effectiveness it needs to rule effectively. Thus, the US and international community have found themselves mired in a commitment that for the last eight years has seen paltry progress. The demands of this nation building strategy were grasped by the American public this fall, when General McChrystal issued his request deployment of 40,000 additional soldiers.

The Obama administration is wary of this commitment and thus finds itself taking a step back, ironically, to the original Bush administration strategy. While Obama has yet to announce the number of troops he will commit, a growing number within the White House are calling for a downsized figure. Over 40 billion dollars have been spent on Afghanistan since 2001, and over 800 American lives have been lost; both public support and troop morale wane as the fight drags on. To justify a downsized commitment, the administration has recently begun re-emphasizing the original American strategy in Afghanistan; Secretary of State Clinton has made several statements this week affirming that the goal of the US in Afghanistan is not nation building, but only pursuing and incapacitating terrorists. A return to the light footprint strategy, if seriously chosen by Obama, will mean a far easier role for the US in Afghanistan.

It will also mean a collapse of the government of Afghanistan. There is a saying among Taliban fighters: “The Americans have watches—we have time.” If US and ISAF forces rapidly downsize their commitments and leave Afghanistan in the hands of the undeveloped and inept Afghan National Army, the Taliban will strengthen its resolve to overthrow the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Pakistan, which is primarily concerned with being allied with the victor of the conflict, will tacitly support them. Leaders of the Taliban and Al Qaeda maintain their mutual ties; thus, a weakened Afghan state and return of Taliban rule would allow for the re-entrenchment of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and a return, politically speaking, to September 10, 2001. Thus, ironically, the strategy under which the US began its invasion may be the same one under which it suffers complete defeat.

Luckily, the US does not have to choose between the impossible task of creating a utopian democracy and of abandoning the national government as a whole. The Taliban should remain the focus of military efforts, but at the same time, the government and the economy must be built up to a basic functioning threshold. Economic development must at least begin as part of a long term effort to pull the populace out of poverty, and the fight against state corruption must continue, no matter how seemingly futile. If sufficient commitment is given to these efforts, the Afghan people will come to have reason for supporting their government over the Taliban. Then, and only then, can we begin the long process of building up a functioning Afghan state, with long term security benefits to the US and the rest of the world.