It is important not to beat around the bush: Iran will obtain nuclear power and more, nuclear weaponry. It won’t be tomorrow, it won’t be next month, but next year? The one after? As time passes, this possibility becomes a certainty. I wish this weren’t the case and I do believe that non-proliferation efforts have a positive effect on the world in which we live. However, there is little that we, as individuals, can do to divert Iran’s current course. In fact, there is little that the American government or international organizations can do to alter this future. The problem that lies before us is not one of prevention, but one of management. How can the US and the international community manage a belligerent, alienated Iran possessing nuclear weapons?

Before I can address this question, it is necessary to establish fully the inevitability of Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weaponry. A 2009 study conducted at Northwestern University of Iranian nationals (“Emerging Sacred Values: The Iranian Nuclear Program” in Judgment and Decision Making) showed that Iran’s nuclear program has acquired a sacred status in Iran. Iranians believe that it is their inalienable right to pursue nuclear power (not nuclear weaponry) and that both the incentives and punishments used by Western nations to dissuade this pursuit are an attempt to deny this right. The government has used this national enthusiasm to pursue its security goal of obtaining a functioning nuclear weapon and production capabilities. Already they possess Shahab missile delivery systems capable of striking targets as far away as Turkey and Eastern Europe. On a political level, nuclear weapons are a necessary component of Iran’s security strategy. Some argue that a tactical military strike by either the US, Israel, or even Saudi Arabia would be capable of destroying their current nuclear capability; however, given the current precautions taken by Iran, their multitude of sites, and their technological knowledge, even the most successful strike could only delay the acquisition of nuclear weaponry by a handful of years. Furthermore, this is not a can that we can keep kicking down the road. Iran and its Arab supporters would learn from any strike and could more successfully control and anticipate future damage. In fact, these strikes could only increase Iran’s commitment to nuclear weaponry. Whereas now Iran has nuclear weapons as a component of its grand strategy, after a strike Iran would feel that nuclear weaponry is their only hope for deterring further violence. In the end, each course we could pursue leads to a nuclear Iran.

Now, to return to the central question, how do we handle a nuclear Iran and an Iran that has been fighting for nuclear power through years of economic sanctions? Our options boil down to three basic categories: military, economic,anddiplomatic. Of course, some specific plans contain elements of each, but general strategy towards Iran can be characterized as one of those types. A military option towards Iran can be immediately discounted. As discussed earlier, a tactical strike on Iran would only increase their commitment to nuclear weaponry. The other option, regime change, is even more ludicrous. Either the attempt is made prior to nuclear acquisition, i.e.,  now, or afterwards. In the first case, there is no nation or association on the planet capable of an even remotely successful invasion of Iran. In the second case, there is no way to guarantee that Iran would be prevented from firing its nuclear warheads before the invading force gains control of their arsenal. That is a risk that no nation would be willing to take. The economic option has just as little promise, although it would be a less spectacular failure. The international community has been imposing greater and greater economic sanctions on Iran for years now with the only significant effect being an ever- increasing commitment to nuclear weaponry. This leaves the diplomatic option. If America is to prevent a nuclear Iran from becoming a menace to the region and the world, strategic and effective diplomatic maneuvering is its only chance.

It has been said that nuclear weapons are the ultimate defensive force. If we are striving to prevent Iran’s use of nuclear weapons, we must realize that this use will likely only occur in the event of a serious threat to Iran’s security or sovereignty. Despite the political rhetoric, the government of Iran knows full well that any offensive use of nuclear force will be met with swift and fierce reprisals. Any government with an interest in staying in power will avoid this situation at all costs. What we need to do, then, is prevent Iran from feeling cornered and without other options. Our efforts to this point have distanced Iran from the rest of the globe, and the burdens of our efforts have been shifted to the Iranian people. If we extend a hand to Iran and welcome them into international society, the response will not be the beginnings of a war, it will be the breaking down of walls. Iran strives to be the paragon of the Middle East; by allowing them fully into the international society as equals, we can effect change there and ensure the region’s safety at the same time.